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Audit engagement partners face conflicting incentives. On one hand, they are motivated to provide high quality audits in order to protect their firms’ reputations and avoid regulatory sanctions but, on the other hand, they also need to please their clients in order to increase their firms’ revenues. We argue that these conflicting incentives become apparent when comparing the equity ownership of partners who conduct audits (i.e., ‘engagement partners’) and partners who are responsible for monitoring audit quality (i.e., ‘review partners’). We predict that review partners are motivated to monitor audit quality more closely when they have larger ownership stakes. In contrast, engagement partners have stronger incentives to please their clients when they have larger ownership stakes. Consistent with these predictions we find that the associations between audit adjustments and partner ownership are: 1) significantly positive for review partners, and 2) significantly negative or insignificant for engagement partners. These results are obtained after controlling for company fixed effects and audit firm fixed effects as well as time-varying characteristics of companies and audit partners. Our findings suggest that larger ownership stakes motivate review partners to monitor audit quality more closely, while larger ownership stakes do not motivate engagement partners to deliver higher quality audits.