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Accounting errors distort the information conveyed to financial statement users and may result in substantial financial losses. When misstatements are identified, it is crucial that error disclosures be appropriate. Prior literature has shown that companies have a strong incentive to manage earnings and avoid restatements, but it is unclear how auditor incentives impact error disclosure decisions. I examine whether factors that may affect auditor independence – such as client importance, audit office industry expertise, audit office growth, and audit market competition – are associated with accounting error disclosure decisions. Using 5,087 accounting errors disclosed in annual financial statements from fiscal year 2006 to 2017, I find that economically important clients are more likely to disclose errors through revisions or adjustments rather than restatements, and that they also are more likely to disclose larger errors through revisions or adjustments. In addition, auditors with industry expertise are less likely to permit disclosure of accounting errors through revisions or adjustments relative to restatements, and they also are less likely to permit larger errors to be disclosed through revisions or adjustments. Both of these findings are strongest in audit offices with negative growth and in audit market with high competition. My findings provide evidence that auditor incentives impact how accounting errors are disclosed. Auditors are more likely to cater to management’s opportunistic error reporting preferences when the economic bond is stronger and when the office is experiencing pressure from negative growth or competition. However, auditors that are more subject to reputation concerns are less likely to allow opportunistic error reporting. My findings should be viewed as important by investors and regulators who are interested in understanding the drivers of accounting error reporting decisions.