Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Personal Schedule
Sign In
The European Union has taken steps to discourage, or prevent, entities from reporting on a quarterly basis, because it believes that interim reporting can encourage a focus on short-term behavior, particularly by the entities. The IASB is interested in answering the following question:
RESEARCH QUESTION
Does frequent reporting encourage or discourage short-term behavior by investors and preparers?
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The key objectives of our study is to assess what is the extent of the frequency of financial reporting on the conditions that can be conducive to myopic behavior. Following here from, we also have as objective to examine what myopic behaviors are likely to follow from the aforementioned relationship and what are the long-term effect of these myopic behaviors on the firms' value and key accounting profitability measures. Specifically, we will assess the relationship between the frequency of financial reporting and (1) the effects of CFO en CEO equity incentives ( i.e. sensitivity of the manager's equity compensation to changes in the firm's stock price (Jiang, Petroni, & Wanh, 2010) and (2) the relationship between the CFO and CEO equity incentives and the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts' consensus forecasts (Jiang, Petroni, & Wanh, 2010) . We also assess the relationship between the frequency of financial reporting and the extent of institutional holdings and their trading strategy i.e. investor myopia (Bushee, 1998).
Subsequently, we will assess the type and extent of myopic behavior(s) exhibited as a result of the relationship between the frequency of financial reporting and the aforementioned items. Some examples of these myopic behaviors are i.e. real earnings management, sub-optimal over or under-investing reflecting either or jointly the Signal Jamming , Lemons problems or Information neglect effects of myopic behavior of preparers. The impact of investor myopia is expected to result in real earnings managements by preparers.Lastly, we examine the relative impact of these myopic behaviors on the firms long-term value.