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Prior studies show that both CEO personal preferences and a firm’s leadership structure affect corporate policies, yet the interacting effects of these two factors on corporate decisions remain unclear. To fill the void, we investigate whether and how CEOs with personal risk-taking preference (i.e., owning a pilot license), will act differently when they are vested with additional power serving as board chairs. Results show that firms led by pilot CEOs have greater firm risks, yet CEO duality attenuates this relationship. Further channel tests show that CEO duality suppresses CEO’s risk-taking tendencies through managers’ reputation concern. It also shows that more able CEO are less affected by duality when pursuing risk-taking activities. The paper sheds lights on how a firm’s leadership structure interacts with CEOs’ personal preference in shaping corporate decisions. It contributes to the literature suggesting CEO duality does not always lead to negative corporate governance outcomes and can serve a disciplinary role.
Jingrong (Karen) Lin, University of Massachusetts Lowell
Khondkar E Karim, University of Massachusetts-Lowell
Rui Hu, California State University Los Angeles
Shaymus Dunn, University of Massachusetts Lowell