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In this paper, I extend the organizational design literature by examining how the ambidextrous strategy choice is affected by the ability to resolve the ambidexterity paradox caused by this strategy. Based on the seminal papers by Antle and Demski (1988) and Feltham and Xie (1994), I argue that the ability to resolve the ambidexterity paradox—effort allocation for increasing productivity while simultaneously learning fundamentally new managerial abilities—depends on the adherence versus non-adherence to controllability, where controllability depends on the informational properties of congruence, sensitivity, and noisiness of performance measures to managerial choices. Using proprietary survey data from a sample of 118 managers at a business-unit level, the empirical results show that, if firms motivate exploitation (exploration) efforts, then high (low) sensitivity, precision, and congruity, are perceived. The results also show that a balanced interaction of exploration–exploitation shifts the tradeoff towards adherence to controllability. Overall, these findings are consistent with the argument that firms design their strategic decision-making around the controllability underlying incentive contracts.