Motivation Crowding: The Curious Case of Slippery Slope Misreporting

• In Event: Accounting Behavior and Organizations

Abstract

Motivation crowding theory suggests economic incentives can amplify or subvert desired behavior. Similarly, slippery slope accounting suggests that once a small infraction occurs it is more likely to occur again. Yet outside accounting, research is conflicted as to whether the decisions to misreport begins down a slope or off a cliff. What if the economic incentive itself is enough to induce an effect, regardless of the starting point? Could the ethical orientation of the individual be enough to resist? In a study of 172 participants, we find that while people oriented towards idealism may resist temptation at first, eventually anyone may succumb. Our results suggest how the slippery slope is measured makes a difference. These differences should make it easier to distinguish problems caused by crowding due to being steeped within a culture of incremental fraud, and one which has pay systems which may unintentionally encourage it.

Authors

• Timothy J Fogarty, Case Western Reserve University

• Jodi Lynn Gissel McDowell, Marquette University

• Joseph M Wall, Marquette University