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This study examines the effect of ASC 842 on the leasing and long-term asset purchase decisions of firms that use EBITDA in executive incentive plans. ASC 842 requires firms to capitalize operating leases, leading to higher leverage and asset base. While the impact on net income over the course of the lease is comparable for operating and finance leases, the impact on EBITDA is materially different. Amortization and interest expenses resulting from finance leases are excluded from EBITDA while operating lease expenses are reported in EBITDA. Consequently, I hypothesize and find that EBITDA-focused firms increase their finance lease liabilities after the issuance of ASC 842 relative to non-EBITDA-focused firms. The increase is lower for EBITDA-focused firms that also apply earnings, balance sheet-based, or stock price targets in their managerial incentive plans. Prior studies document that EBITDA-focused firms are overleveraged and overinvest in capital. Because ASC 842 increases firms’ leverage further, I expect and find that EBITDA-focused firms decrease their purchases of long-term assets relative to non-EBITDA-focused firms. The reduction is greater for highly leveraged firms, and smaller for firms with significant cash reserves. Finally, while the profitability of non-EBITDA-focused firms increases following the issuance of ASC 842, I do not find an increase in the profitability of EBITDA-focused firms. Overall, the study documents an unintended consequence of ASC 842 and highlights the adverse effects of the use of EBITDA as a performance metric.