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In the aftermath of the Cold War, Western governments sought to construct an expanded European security architecture with the North Atlantic Security Organization (NATO) as the strategic linchpin. A NATO-centric order served Western interests by maintaining American power on the continent – an insurance against future instability – and preserving their privileged positions as legacy members. This approach, however, produced a strategic dilemma for the Baltic states, which were now positioned between an increasingly antagonized Russia and Western governments unresponsive to their membership aspirations.
This paper argues that, throughout the 1990s, Western governments were slow to comprehend the predicament their actions forced onto the Baltic states and often misunderstood the logic driving their NATO aspirations. Policymakers in Washington and London frequently articulated idiosyncratic or pathological theories of Baltic foreign policy, while neglecting the formative role their own strategies played in exacerbating insecurity in the Baltic states. Drawing on newly released archival evidence and interviews with key Western policymakers, this study hopes to internationalize the story of Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture by bringing actors other than the US and Russia – namely the UK and the Baltic states – into the conversation. It also aims to enrich our understanding of the strategic dynamics present in Eastern Europe during the 1990s and contribute to a more holistic theory of Baltic NATO aspirations.