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Singapore does not have specific laws regulating redistricting or apportionment of legislative seats. Neither does the country have an independent election commission. Does Singapore’s boundary delimitation practice meet international standards of electoral integrity? Do voters care about gerrymandering? Did the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) benefit from the redistricting to secure its large 69% win in the 2015 general elections? To answer these questions, this paper will compare the mass and elite attitudes towards the Elections Department of Singapore based on available public opinion survey data. It traces the pre-electoral changes introduced since 1988 and the criteria and rules used by Singapore’s Electoral Boundary Review Committee for redistricting and malapportionment over the last three decades. To assess the partisan effects of gerrymandering, I use measures of swing ratio and electoral disproportionality to assess it s mechanical effects on electoral competitiveness. Additionally, I also measure the partisan effects of malapportionment by comparing the ratio of the largest and smallest constituency to the electoral quota. My study finds that the pre-electoral changes in redistricting in the 2000s has produced less disproportionality and malapportionment compared to the elections in the 1990s.