Epistemic Bases of Prior Beliefs Predict Selective Use of Arguments From Evidence Versus Emotion-Based Texts

• In Event: Reading for Understanding: Initial Studies of Students and Teachers Using Multiple Sources in Content Areas

Abstract

Objectives: Public beliefs about scientific claims are of interest to educators concerned with increasing the public’s understanding of science (e.g., Corner & Hahn, 2009). Emotion-based beliefs, as opposed to evidence-based beliefs, may be quite common and could be partially responsible for public controversy over matters that are not scientifically controversial (e.g., Griffin, 2003). The goal of the present study was to test whether students' willingness to use various texts about a science topic that present either evidence-based arguments or emotional appeals depend upon the epistemic basis (evidence versus emotion) of their topic-specific prior beliefs.

Theoretical Framework: Unlike additive models of belief formation that relegate emotional preferences to being a mere supplement to evidence-based reasoning (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Thagard, 2006), the competitive model of belief formation proposes that emotional preferences may lead individuals to bypass the normative reasoning processes involved during the evaluation of evidence and explanatory coherence (Griffin, 2008), and thereby constrain how people process belief-relevant information. This varying reliance upon emotion versus evidentiary considerations is referred to as one’s belief-basis and serves as the theoretical framework for this study.

Methods and Data Sources: We assessed 76 undergraduates’ belief or disbelief regarding the theory of biological evolution, their evolution belief-bases using a validated scale (Griffin, 2008), and the accuracy of their prior knowledge about evolution. In a subsequent session, participants read eight belief-relevant texts varying on their position (i.e., pro or anti-evolution) and argument-basis (evidence or emotion-based). Participants rated each text for the extent they thought it presented “evidence-based reasons to support its position” and “emotion-based reasons to support its position”. Finally, participants rated whether each text “provided information [they] would personally use to support [their] belief regarding whether or not evolution is true”. Ratings were assessed using a Likert-type scale where ‘1’ represents strong disagreement and ‘9’ represents strong agreement.

Findings and Analysis: Many participants did not report selective use of the evidence-based arguments. Some participants selectively used texts that they themselves acknowledge were less evidence-based and more affect-based. This selective use of texts was predicted by whether readers previously reported that they had based their evolution beliefs in evidence or emotional motivations. Individuals with emotion-based beliefs were more likely to report using emotion-based text arguments and less likely to report using evidence-based arguments, and the reverse was true for evidence-based individuals.

Implications: People who report more reliance on emotional motivations relative to evidence when forming their beliefs are not only less likely to selectively use available evidence-based arguments, but some even show a selective use of affect-based over evidence based arguments. This supports a competitive rather than additive model of belief formation in which the influence of emotional preferences reduces attention to and use of available relevant evidence. These findings also have implications for research on science learning from multiple documents and sources, and suggest that even when learners identify the more valid and evidence-based claims, some learners will choose not to selectively defer to this information and even choose sources that provide emotional appeals.

Authors

• Carlos R. Salas, University of Illinois at Chicago

• Thomas D. Griffin, University of Illinois at Chicago