Some Like It Hot: How Emotions Tinge Laypeople’s Understanding of Scientific Controversies

• In Event: Public Understanding of Science: The Educational Challenges of Scientific “Uncertainty”

Abstract

Scientific controversies are – in an epistemological sense – argumentative approaches towards the best conclusion. They might involve conflicts between persons, but these arise from a topic-inherent cognitive conflict underlying the controversy. Controversies are not predominately made up by the opponents, e.g. because they are at strife with one another. Therefore, such emotional “side effects” are not the dominant explanation for scientific controversies. We assume that laypeople, who are in search of 'certain' knowledge, may struggle with scientific controversy especially when the conflict displayed is emotionally charged: Then the conflict might appear to be rather interpersonal than inherent to the topic. Therefore, we focus on laypeople’s cognitive processing of scientific controversies that differ with regard to the emotionality included. Dependent variables include credibility of experts and change in epistemic assumptions (pre-post administration of the questionnaire CAEB, Stahl & Bromme, 2007).
For study 1 (N = 42), we invented two versions of a newspaper article about two experts who controversially discussed the benefits and harms of a fictional anesthetic: a neutral version where the discussion of the experts was displayed as neutral and fair and a contentious version where affectivity and asperity was included. With regard to credibility ratings, contentiousness significantly lowers the perceived credibility of experts with regard to several aspects (e.g. both experts were perceived as less likeable in the contentious condition. ANOVAs reveal significant changes toward a more advanced view for both factors of the CAEB (texture: F (1, 40) = 16.70, p <.01, ηp² = .33; variability: F (1, 40) = 11.76, p <.01, ηp² = .23) and, more important, a significant interaction between the pre-post comparison and condition (neutral vs. contentious) for the factor texture (F (1, 40) = 4.38, p <.05, ηp² = .10). In the contentious condition, participants showed less change in their epistemic assumptions, that is, the conflict displayed seems to be perceived as less cognitive and more interpersonal.
In study 2 (N = 39), we provided an explanation for the controversy displayed: In one condition (interpersonal framing), we emphasized that experts commonly show an irascible and prejudiced discussion behavior in scientific discourses, while in the other condition (cognitive framing) we emphasized that uncertainties are daily routine in science. Both framings were integrated into the contentious newspaper article of study 1. Results indicate that credibility ratings were not differentially influenced by framing. However, ANOVAs reveal significant changes toward a more advanced view for both factors of the CAEB (texture: F (1,37) = 15.12, p <.01, ηp² = .29; variability: F (1, 37) = 9.51, p <.01, ηp² = .21) and remarkable interactions between the pre-post comparison and condition for both factors (texture: F (1,37) = 7.14, p <.05, ηp² = .16; variability: F (1, 37) = 3.80, p = .06, ηp² = .09), indicating that cognitive framing seems to help to focus on the cognitive conflict which resulted in stronger epistemic change.
We will discuss implications of our studies for laypeople’s understanding of scientific controversies and derive suggestions for communicating scientific uncertainty.

Authors

• Rainer F. Bromme, University of Münster

• Dorothe Kienhues, University of Münster