Paper Summary

A Theoretical Model of Parental Choice: How Signals of Quality Affect Enrollment in New Zealand

Tue, April 17, 2:15 to 3:45pm, Vancouver Convention Centre, Floor: First Level, East Ballroom A

Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical framework upon which the signal of school quality is decided upon by schools in order to attract parents to enroll. In 1989 New Zealand effectively devolved school management practice to the school level for all public schools. While efficiency and equity drove the move for decentralization, it was hypothesized that innovation would be a bi-product of “choice.” School choice is represented as a dynamic game of incomplete information in a simplified representation of supply and demand. Information on school student body composition and school innovative practice are key determinants of enrollment decisions for parents. I solve for pooling, separating and semi-separating equilibria for a set of school and parental utilities over the choice to enroll.

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