Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Room
Browse By Unit
Browse By Session Type
Browse By Descriptor
Search Tips
Annual Meeting Theme
Exhibitors
About Philadelphia
About AERA
Personal Schedule
Sign In
X (Twitter)
The study of individuals’ epistemic beliefs has become a popular line of inquiry. Given the growing empirical evidence that epistemological thinking “matters” (Hofer, 2001; Kuhn, 1999), the notion of epistemic beliefs has been incorporated into more encompassing theories, such as theoretical models of self-regulated learning (Muis, 2007) and metacognition (e.g., Hofer, 2004; Kitchener, 1983; Kuhn, 2000). However, as Bendixen and Rule (2004) argued, an important question that has not been addressed in the literature is the role that affect plays in facilitating or constraining epistemological thinking and reasoning. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) have also called for research to explore the link between emotion and epistemic beliefs, but little has been done to date. As such, what is still lacking is consideration of the emotions that individuals experience in relation to the epistemic nature of a task.
In this study, we address this gap in the literature. Specifically, by drawing from several theoretical models from the epistemic beliefs (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Hofer & Pintrich, 2007), self-regulated learning (Greene et al., 2010; Muis, 2007), and academic emotions (Pekrun, 2006; Pekrun, Goetz, Titz, & Perry, 2002) literatures, we integrate these perspectives to explore the role that epistemic emotions play in mediating relations between epistemic beliefs, self-regulated learning, and learning outcomes.
Four hundred thirty-nine post-secondary students participated (N = 360 females). Students took a prior knowledge test on climate change and then completed Bråten and Strømsø’s (2009) 24-item Topic-Specific Epistemic Beliefs Questionnaire (TSEBQ) to measure their epistemic beliefs about climate change. Two pairs of conflicting texts on the causes and effects of climate change were then presented, which were adopted from Strømsø, Bråten, and Britt (2009). The emotions participants experienced while reading were measured using the Epistemic Emotions Scales (EES; Pekrun & Meier, 2011). After participants read all four texts, their studying behaviors were assessed using the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 1993), adapted to reflect “this task.” To measure learning from text, a 21-item inference verification test (IVT) was adopted from Strømsø et al. (2009) to assess deep-level understanding of individual texts.
Analyses revealed that epistemic beliefs predicted epistemic emotions such that individuals who believed that knowledge about climate change is fixed, simple, handed down by authorities, and personally justified experienced higher levels of confusion, anxiety, boredom, and frustration, and lower levels of curiosity and enjoyment. Conversely, students who believed that knowledge about climate change is tentative, complex, actively constructed, and justified through critical thinking and evaluation and integration of multiple sources experienced higher levels of curiosity and enjoyment and lower levels of confusion, anxiety, frustration, and boredom. Epistemic emotions also mediated relations between epistemic beliefs and learning strategies, and learning strategies predicted learning outcomes. Implications for the epistemic beliefs, self-regulated learning, and academic emotions literatures will be discussed.
Krista R. Muis, McGill University
Reinhard Pekrun, University of Essex
Gale M. Sinatra, University of Southern California
Roger Azevedo, North Carolina State University
Gregory Trevors, McGill University
Elisabeth Meier, University of Munich
Benjamin C. Heddy, University of Oklahoma