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1. Objectives
a) To present a theoretical cultural-historical approach to mathematical concepts.
b) To provide classroom examples to support the idea that mathematical concepts are both general and material, abstract and concrete, historical and present, and to stress some implications for teaching and learning.
2. Theoretical Framework
The term “concept” has been usually understood either as a transcendental entity or as a mental object. These two meanings reflect in a perfect manner the agony of Western epistemologies to come to grips with the question of the relationship between subject and object. Transcendentalism emphasizes the pole of the object: it assumes a mind-independent reality. Idealism (either in its traditional Cartesian variant or in its contemporary embodied versions) emphasizes the pole of the subject: it assumes that the human mind is endowed with the capacity to produce its own concepts. By emphasizing one pole to the detriment of the other, these epistemologies, which have had a tremendous impact on educational research, fail to offer an encompassing view of concepts. In particular, both fail to take into account the concepts’ contextual, cultural, and historical nature.
In this presentation, we show how concepts must be understood in terms of the realms of the general and sensuous reality. Hegel (1830/2009) criticized Kant for offering an impoverished idea of these two realms and for holding too strong a distinction between them. Kant, in Hegel’s view, adopts a weak concept of the concrete world and subjectivity. Hegel suggested a different approach in which mind and world, the abstract and the concrete, are fused together. To the static ontology of Kant, Platonists and Idealists, Hegel opposed an ontology of movement. I draw on Hegel’s work to articulate an approach in which concepts are crystalized historical forms of human action continuously affected and transformed by social practices. Codified in culture, concepts are pure possibility or virtuality. The concept of number, for instance, is a pure possibility (e.g., to count things or to carry out complex calculations). To come into existence, concepts have to be endowed with particular determinations. Their coming into existence is the event of their appearance—an always new and unrepeatable sensuous and material event, simultaneously historical and actual, in which the abstract and the concrete come together.
3. Methods
Our methods of inquiry are both philosophical and experimental.
4. Data Sources
We make a critical analysis of Hegel’s dialectics and new (modern and postmodern) materialisms to provide insights into the nature of concepts in mathematics. Our experimental investigations of concrete teaching and learning lessons (based on fine-grained video analysis of students’ sensuous activity) allow us to generate hypothesis and theory about concepts as historically codified reflective human action.
5. Results
We offer a cultural-historical view of concepts that overcomes the dualism of idealist and empiricist approaches (e.g. Kant’s, Hume’s) and that offers new insights into mathematics teaching and learning.