At the Convergence of Different Paths: Contributions From the Research on Historical Thinking and Personal Epistemology

• In Event: Roundtable Session 7
  In Roundtable Session: A Janus Head or the Same Side of the Medallion? Innovating and Improving Historical Reasoning and Understanding

Abstract

Much recent scholarly work in history education has been focused at the intersection of learning to think historically and the personal epistemic beliefs that appear to enable or retard it (Havekes, et al., 2012; Lee, 2004; Seixas, 2000; VanSledright, 2011). This has been the case among studies of K-16 students and history teachers, both prospective and practicing. The purpose of these efforts has been to more deeply understand the relationship between learning to think historically and personal epistemic beliefs about history, for understanding the past depends heavily on (a) the capability to reason in a disciplined way about that past and (b) being able to do so in ways that allow for teaching it to others.
In order to establish its theoretical perspective, this paper draws from research in three education-science areas: on historical thinking, in epistemic cognition/personal epistemology, and on teachers’ beliefs (e.g., Bendixen & Feucht, 2010; Browlee, Schraw, & Berthelsen, 2011; Hofer & Pintrich, 2002; Khine, 2008; Lee, 2004; Levesque, 2008; Stearns, Seixas, & Wineburg, 2000). It also draws on a series of empirical studies conducted over a 10-year period to describe the role epistemic beliefs plays in advancing (or limiting) growth in historical thinking (e.g., Maggioni, Fox, & Alexander, 2010; Maggioni, VanSledright, & Reddy, 2009; VanSledright, Maggioni, & Reddy, 2012). It shows, for example, how naïve beliefs (naïve objectivism, naïve relativism) about the nature of history and the objects from the past that may serve as sources for making sense of that past (e.g., heritage resources) can impede growth in historical thinking. In the USA, common history curricula, teaching practices, and uncritical uses of heritage objects in learning history foster these naïve epistemic beliefs.
A different set of epistemic beliefs—what we refer to as criterialism—holds considerable promise for advancing the capability to think historically and teach it well. The paper describes the parameters of this criterialist position and points to the means by which it can be taught and learned. However, we note that learners (K-16 and teachers) tend to “wobble” (slip back and forth between various aspects of epistemic positioning) as they transition from naïve beliefs to more sophisticated ones, such as criterialism. We argue that acknowledging this “wobbling” problem may be the first and most important step in dealing with it more effectively.
Bringing together results from different research traditions, while applying them to empirical studies, contribute to addressing the wobbling problem in two ways. First, doing so offers a better conceptualization of the construct studied, namely, personal epistemology. Without it, the calls for the development and integration of theoretical models in learning and teaching historical thinking are unlikely to be fully addressed. And second, it provides some ideas about the design of feasible interventions that foster epistemic competence and improved historical thinking by avoiding the pitfalls revealed through empirical studies. Put differently, it builds off the promising aspects of previous intervention attempts to suggest new ideas that help alleviate the difficulties people experience with wobbling as their epistemic beliefs are challenged.

Authors

• Liliana Maggioni, The Catholic University of America

• Bruce A. VanSledright, University of North Carolina - Charlotte