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Our paper uses agent based modeling to examine how income-based admissions policies affect the racial and economic distribution of students between colleges of differing levels of selectivity. Our models have two agents (students and colleges), and three basic steps (application, admission and enrollment). We allow students to vary their behavior based on their race and resources and allow colleges to have heterogeneous admissions policies- some schools use race-based affirmative action and some use income-based affirmative action. We also vary the magnitude of these “bumps.” We examine student sorting as we vary these admissions policies. We find that reasonable income-based affirmative action policies do not produce levels of racial diversity achieved under simulated race-based affirmative action policies.
Sean F. Reardon, Stanford University
Matthew Kasman, Stanford University
Daniel Klasik, University of Maryland - College Park
Rachel Baker, Stanford University
Joseph B. Townsend, Stanford University