Epistemic Injustice in Educational Research: The Case of Intellectual Disability

• In Event: 16.051 - Justice, Democracy, and Educational Policy

Abstract

Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s (2007) account of “epistemic injustice,” Jeff Frank (2013) suggests that our epistemic practices in educational research and theory can contribute to the silencing of particular social groups and can impede the development of more accurate understandings of our social world and educational institutions. In this paper, I argue that two types of epistemic injustice described by Fricker – hermeneutical and testimonial – are commonly experienced by people with intellectual disabilities, and further argue that these injustices have important implications for educational research, theorizing, and policy-making. Exploring this question can help us to better understand educational researchers’ obligations to individuals with intellectual disabilities, and can in turn help guide future research practice and policy.

Author

• Ashley Taylor, Colgate University