Policy, Vendors, and the Common Core State Standards: Emerging Issues and Recommendations

• In Event: 16.043 - Internal and External Influences on Common Core Policy Implementation

Abstract

Objective
The paper’s objectives are to: 1) to describe the commercial and political spaces created by CCSS for increased private sector influence on public instruction, 2) to acknowledge and describe the role of vendor-policy interaction in meditating the implementation of national education agendas, using the case of NCLB, 3) to identify both emerging issues and potential levers available to states and districts for addressing issues flowing from expanded private sector involvement in design and delivery of instructional core (assessment, curriculum and instruction).

Theoretical Framework
A central principle for understanding the role of private interests and the corporate sector in national level policy processes is the Iron Triangle. Under this framework, interest groups, congress and bureaucratic agencies interpret and act on policies in ways that are mutually beneficial, and in their combined influence, create self-serving and impenetrable public policy. We use the iron triangle metaphor to explore parallel networks or fields of influence operating inside of these larger political process, where by individual corporations and their staff make public policy decisions that have a very powerful influence on instructional opportunities for low-income youth.

Data Sources
The arguments presented draws on data collected for a larger project on K-12 public policy and education companies. The research examines interactions between technology vendors and government agencies as a case of the private organizations’ evolving influence in instructional reform. The work is mixed methods and includes case studies based on ethnographic work as well as statistical analysis of administrative, provider level and student level outcome data.

Conclusions
I argue that the CCSS follow in the footsteps of past accountability reforms in creating demand for testing products and the outsourcing of functions that bear heavily on instruction, as what gets tested often gets taught. CCSS also create a specific new market for online testing and therefore room for highly influential technology companies (e.g. software developers and web search companies) to do more business with public schools. While described as a state-driven voluntary organization, the CCSS also create room for vendors to exert influence over important decisions that will determine what kind of instruction is rewarded or punished. CCSS are envisioned as a kind of palliative to NCLB, correcting for NCLB’s inattention to quality of tests and alignment of test measures. However, whether CCSS delivers on that promise depends heavily on the will and capacity of outside vendors to attend seriously to these issues in the design of products and services. It also turns on how vendors weigh commercial interests (e.g. trying to sell more while spending less) with public policy objectives of rigorous learning opportunities for all students.

Significance
CCSS is nested in a broader political environment where public schools have come under increasing pressure to contract out core functions of instruction; mirroring the rise of privatizing initiatives in other aspects of social policy. So far, public discourse on the CCSS has focused strongly on top-down incentives from state and federal governments, masking the benefits for and involvement of the private sector.

Authors

• Patricia Burch, University of Southern California

• Annalee G. Good, University of Wisconsin - Madison

• Andrew LaFave, University of Southern California