Positioning Epistemic Cognition Within the Educational and Psychological Literatures: Relational Complements and Complexities

• In Event: Translating Scholarship on Epistemic Cognition: Fostering Public Knowledge and Knowing

Abstract

As a still emerging concept within the educational and psychological literatures, epistemic cognition holds promise to contribute meaningfully to the discourse on knowledge and the process of knowing. However, for that promise to be realized it is essential that the very conception of epistemic cognition become more sharply honed and well positioned within the rich but complicated literatures that have given it birth. Thus, in an effort to situate the construct of epistemic cognition within the extant educational and psychological literatures, it becomes necessary to establish—to the degree possible—its very nature. That is to say, how do those engaged in the theoretical or empirical investigation of epistemic cognition (e.g., Greene, Azevedo, & Torney-Purta, 2008; Hofer, in press) define this abstract idea and describe its salient attributes or features? What are the parameters for what stands as epistemic cognition relative to all other forms of human mental processing? Further, how do those invested in the study of epistemic cognition seek to systematically distinguish it from other closely related terms pertaining to knowledge and knowing that populate the discourse (e.g., epistemology, personal epistemology, epistemic beliefs, or metacognition)? Moreover, in order to situate epistemic cognition as an educational and psychological concept, it is necessary to consider what associations it may have to other foundational constructs such as learning (e.g., Alexander, Schallert, & Reynolds, 2009), development (Byrnes, 2001), or thinking (Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2013), as well as to various forms of reasoning that have been systematically investigated, such as argumentative (Iordanou, Kendeou, & Beker, in press; Lin, Horng, & Anderson, 2014), and causal or logical reasoning (Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003; Moshman & Tarricone, in press).
In order to address these questions, I will interrogate the literatures in epistemic cognition (e.g., Chinn, Buckland, & Samarapungavan, 2011; Greene, Sandoval, & Bråten, in press) as well as related literatures in learning, development, thinking, and reasoning in order to compare and contrast not only the various definitions of epistemic cognition that have been proffered, but also the patterns that emerge between epistemic cognition and the family of epistemological constructs found within those literatures. In addition, I will attempt to map out the complementary or competing relations that seemingly exist between epistemic cognition and other foundational constructs such as metacognition, theory of mind, as well as argumentative and causal/logical reasoning (e.g., Barzilai & Zohar, 2014; Flavell, 2004).
By engaging in such a systematic interrogation of the educational and psychological literatures, I will seek to identify the emergent properties of epistemic cognition as an educational and psychological construct—properties that can be applied in its conceptualization and operationalization. I will also weigh its unique contributions over and above other associated terms pertaining to knowledge and the process of knowing. By more clearly differentiating epistemic cognition from other educational and psychological terms and constructs, those invested in this line of inquiry should be better able to translate the growing research into meaningful policies and effective practices.

Author

• Patricia A. Alexander, University of Maryland - College Park