Measuring and Modeling Epistemic Cognition in Service of Translational Research

• In Event: Translating Scholarship on Epistemic Cognition: Fostering Public Knowledge and Knowing

Abstract

The study of epistemic cognition is indeed a bit difficult to unpack, both in terms of models and measures. However, this is a challenge that must be met if we are to heed Hofer’s (in press) call for increasing the utility value of epistemic cognition for teachers and others seeking to translate research into practice.
In this presentation, I will draw on recent work on modeling and measuring epistemic cognition to make the following six points. To make progress in the field of epistemic cognition, we must: 1) put “cognition” back in epistemic cognition, 2) move beyond self-report and dichotomized measures, 3) move towards epistemic practices, 4), contextualize epistemic cognition, 5) measure growth and change, and finally, 6) expand how we think about epistemic cognition to include motivational, metacognitive, and conceptual change processes.
First, by putting “cognition” back in “epistemic cognition,” I suggest we must differentiate epistemic beliefs (i.e., the contents of cognition) from the process of thinking about knowledge (i.e., epistemic cognition). Currently, these constructs are somewhat confounded in the literature. Emphasis on this distinction will move us forward in our understanding of the dynamic process that is epistemic cognition. Second, many researchers have called for a move beyond the use of self-report measures of epistemic beliefs which lend themselves to interpretations of knowledge as dichotomous (e.g., either simply or complex or either certain or uncertain). Researchers must consider new methods of measurement that can capture the process of engaging in epistemic cognition. Third, if epistemic cognition is a process, perhaps a focus on epistemic practices will help crystalize that process (Chinn & Rinehart, in press). That is, we must more fully explore how individuals use their beliefs and conceptions of knowledge in reasoning, problem solving, and decision-making. Fourth, it has been clear for sometime that epistemic beliefs and epistemic cognition must be considered within a context. This goes beyond the work that suggests they are domain-specific. This is a call for studying epistemic cognition in the context of thinking, reasoning, and problem solving. Fifth, capturing how the process of epistemic cognition changes developmentally and over time is key to understanding the catalysts of epistemic change. Finally, definitions of epistemic cognition must be refined, but at the same time expanded to consider not only cognitive processes, but motivational (e.g., epistemic aims; Chinn & Rinehart, 2014), metacognitive (e.g., meta-epistemic practices; Barzilai & Zohar, in press), and conceptual change processes (e.g., epistemic conceptual change; Sinatra & Chinn, 2011) as well.
If researchers in epistemic cognition take the effort to overcome these conceptual and measurement challenges creatively, then likely this field will find that unpacking the complexity of epistemic cognition will indeed prove worth the effort, and it will improve educators’ and the public’s understanding of learners’ thinking and reasoning processes.

Author

• Gale M. Sinatra, University of Southern California