Potential Opt-Out Implications for Schools, Teachers, and Principals

• In Event: Inside the Opt Out Movement: The Role of Parent Protest in Educational Change

Abstract

Objective: Available data and press coverage suggests that standardized test opt-outs have gained footing in multiple states over the past five years. Whether this momentum involves sufficient numbers of students and parents to appreciably impact test-based accountability measures remains an open question. We explore that question for Pennsylvania by examining the degree to which student opt-outs might influence the state’s school rating system, the School Performance Profile (SPP). If performance ratings are vulnerable to relatively small numbers of student opt-outs, the rating system loses some explanatory power.

Theoretical framework: Our work is situated in examinations of the theory of performance-based accountability, which holds that providing schools and districts with detailed student performance data, demanding that schools meet rigorous minimum proficiency requirements, and administering high-stakes sanctions and incentives, will give school and district leaders the tools and motivation to improve student achievement (Haertel & Herman, 2005; Hamilton, Berends & Stecher, 2005; Linn, 2005). This theory assumes that all students will take the standardized tests upon which the accountability system is based. By examining what could happen to an accountability system when this assumption is not met, our research tests the validity of this theory and its implications.

Methods and Data Sources: First, we examine the threshold at which student opt-outs can introduce sufficient sampling error into the student performance data to make resulting school scores poor reflections of actual school performance. Using information from the PA School Performance Profile website, we conduct two simulations to illustrate what could happen if a few students opted out of state tests in one Pennsylvania school. Then, we outline the potential impact of student opt-outs on the sanctions component of performance-based accountability – specifically, teacher and principal ratings and Title I funding.

Results/substantiated conclusions: Our simulation demonstrates that small numbers of student opt-outs could impact school ratings. Although 2014-15 SPP have not yet been released, simulations with 2012-13 data show that, for a test-case school, 11 high-performing student opt-outs would push the school’s performance rating below the state’s “acceptable” threshold, and 20 low-performing student opt-outs would push the school’s rating into the next-highest performance band. The opt-out trend in Pennsylvania could also have far-ranging effects on teacher and principal effectiveness ratings, as a substantial portion of these ratings are based on students’ test scores.

Scholarly Significance: For teachers and administrators, who are personally and/or collectively impacted by their school’s ratings, it is important to understand the degree of error that may be inherent in those ratings. The number and type of students opting out are important data that state departments of education should collect and share. It is imperative that policymakers understand the impact of opt-outs as they continue to craft policies attaching incentives and sanctions to school performance. The potential sensitivity of school performance ratings to opt-outs also highlights the importance of the federal response – and potential codification in an ESEA re-write – to states that have requested leniency in minimum participation rates in ESEA due to the increasing number of opt-outs.

Authors

• Jessica K. Beaver, Research for Action

• Lucas Westmaas, Research for Action