The Predictable Failure of Federal Sanctions–Driven Accountability for School Improvement—and Why We May Retain It Anyway

• In Event: 52.053 - Learning From the Federal Market-Based Reforms: Lessons for the Every Student Succeeds Act

Abstract

The federal accountability system under No Child Left Behind is a system driven by quotas and sanctions, stipulating the progression of underperforming schools through sanctions based on meeting performance quotas for specific demographic groups (Sennett, 2006). In this session, the presenters examine whether the federal accountability system is likely to succeed or fail, by asking, “Does the sanctions-driven accountability system work?” Is it practical? And is it legitimate among those who must implement it? The presenters argue that even though sanctions-driven accountability may fail on practical outcomes, it may be retained for its secondary benefits and because there is a sense that credible policy alternatives are lacking. They conclude by proposing alternative policies and approaches to the current system.

To answer these research questions, the session draws from the work of industrial psychologists (Latham & Pinder, 2005), organizational sociology (Sennett, 2006), and institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 2006) to trace the logic of an accountability system driven by sanctions and quotas. These theories regard schools as connected to and affected by the larger system of relations that constitutes the school system and offers insights into how institutional mechanisms structure organizational responses to change. For example, normative mechanisms include conceptions of preferred or desirable behavior and specify how things should be done (Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Scott, 2001), while cognitive frameworks influence behavior by creating shared conceptions of reality and the frames through which meaning is made. These institutional mechanisms serve different functions. They may operate to promote the diffusion of innovations by providing legitimacy for new structures and programs (Meyer & Rowan, 2006). They may also promote change through indirect means, as when regulatory systems, which often exert only weak effects, bring about change by stimulating other institutional mechanisms such as normative processes (Scott, 2001). They may also preserve existing practices, as cognitive structures do when they shape particular approaches to instruction.

To answer the first question the presenters will examine data that would suggest that the system produced the expected gains in student learning as well as data that would suggest a link between prescribed sanctions and school improvement. The second question is concerned with the processes of productive school improvement. It will examine whether performance indicators, goals, and sanctions provide practical answers to a range of student performance and learning needs. The final question will examine whether sanction-based accountability systems are valued by teaching professionals from a normative perspective.

This research has both scholarly and policy implications. For scholars it examines sanction based accountability systems from a range of perspectives. It not only looks at whether test scores improve, but also other indicators important for determining student learning gains and school improvement. From a policy perspective it provides a framework for examining the Every Student Succeeds Act, which continues many of the same approaches to student and school improvement. Finally, it considers the difficulties of identifying policy alternatives that would adequately address the complexities of schooling.

Authors

• Rick Mintrop, University of California - Berkeley

• Gail Sunderman, University of Maryland