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School Reconstitution as a Turnaround Strategy: An Analysis of the Evidence

Sun, April 30, 8:15 to 10:15am, Henry B. Gonzalez Convention Center, Floor: Meeting Room Level, Room 216 A

Abstract

School reconstitution is one of many “corrective action” strategies that have been emphasized as a viable means for "turning around" low-performing schools. It seeks to enhance the stock of human capital in schools by replacing large percentages of a school’s staff with individuals. This paper analyzes the theoretical assumptions that underlie this approach and the empirical research on the effectiveness of school reconstitution as a strategy for improving school performance.

School reconstitution reforms pivot on sets of assumptions about how organizational incentives and organizational capacity affect organizational performance. In brief, this policy relies on the threat of sanction as well as the application of sanction, to motivate individuals to improve organizational performance. The basic assumption is that threatening to re-staff schools by placing them on “alert status,” on “probation,” or on “reconstitution eligible” lists will motivate the people who work in them to exert greater effort. Sometimes reconstituted schools receive additional resources; in these instances, policies assume that the incentives are required to ensure that school personnel will make effective use of these new resources. Where additional resources are not provided, policies assume that incentives will motivate personnel to make more efficient use of extant resources. While many reconstitution policies are driven primarily, if not exclusively, by an emphasis on incentives, they typically include provisions that affect school capacity because schools cannot improve unless they have both the will and the capacity to do so.

We examine the empirical evidence on how both the threat and the application of reconstitution affect a school’s incentive and capacity to improve its performance. We base our analysis on a systematic review of the limited number of empirical studies that document how school reconstitution functions as a school improvement strategy.

In general, the available research suggests that school reconstitution can be a risky strategy, particularly if it is not accompanied by sufficient relevant resources. For instance, on general indicators of teacher quality newly hired staffs may be less equipped to handle their responsibilities than the educators they replaced. Without appropriate resource commitments and sufficient time to plan and prepare, reconstituted schools may be left with the lowest quality teachers, an inadequate resource base, and a chaotic climate that undercuts any potential of the policy to promote school improvement.

Although school reconstitution is a prominent reform strategy, its actual effects may harm rather than help struggling schools. Therefore, we conclude other strategies may be more prudent and recommend that:
• policymakers consider reconstitution only if they are able to do what it takes to ensure an adequate supply of effective teachers and administrators, recruit these educators to and retain them in reconstituted schools, and provide the full range of resources required to support the ongoing work of improving student performance;
• policymakers take the time needed to plan how school reconstitution initiatives might be implemented in particular contexts and to evaluate these initiatives through studies that examine the actual effects of reconstitution and the conditions that must hold for this turnaround strategy to realize its stated aims.

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