The Design of Teacher Compensation Structures in Performance-Pay Policies: An Analysis of Latin American Models

• In Event: 58.018 - Market-Based Teacher Accountability Policies and Practices: Global Perspectives and Critiques

Abstract

Purpose

Education policy frameworks worldwide are full of proposals to link teacher salaries to performance. This paper examines how teacher pay-for-performance is understood in several Latin American countries. It specifically examines the design features of teacher compensation schemes and what innovations they incorporate to traditional pay schemes. The study addresses the following research questions: (a) What are the goals of performance pay policies? What policy problems do the address? (b) How is teacher pay structured in performance pay policies? (c) How do pay structures in performance pay policies differ from conventional pay structures?

Perspectives

They study’s analytic framework combines different perspectives. First, it turns to notions and perspectives used in education policy analysis. Drawing from Stetcher et al.’s (2010), Heyburn, Lewis, and Ritter (2010) and other authors, the study examines the concerns that motivated the adoption of the performance pay policies as well as key design features. The design features analyzed involve the policy goals, the structure of the performance pay, eligibility and participation criteria, and the amount of the performance incentive. In addition, the study turns to psychological theories of work motivation and to economic theories of incentives to further understand the goals and rationale of performance pay policies. Finally, I turn to the literature on organizations and public administration, human resources, and incentives, particularly to notions about types of payment schemes and how these schemes relate to conventional pay schemes.

Data and Methods

The study uses a comparative case-study method, where the unit of comparison is the actual performance-pay policy. In most cases I work with national policies, but for some federal countries I also examine state-level policies. Data come from policy documents, regulations, and administrative norms available electronically. I have also collected education laws, national education plans, and other education reform documents, also available electronically.

Findings

Preliminary findings show that teacher pay schemes within pay for performance policies do not radically vary from conventional pay schemes. They introduce some complexities and innovations, yet they do not structurally change teachers’ career and pay schemes.

Significance

Performance pay policies require well designed and implemented programs. Some authors argue that many of the practical challenges can be addressed through careful design and continuous refinement. Yet, most research centers on the effects of these programs on student achievement or on teacher behavior. There is also research on how plans are adopted, the policy environment or the politics of performance pay plans, and on the teacher performance and assessment component more than on teacher pay. I pose that the specific features of the “reformed” payment schemes are the least understood component of the reforms. The “treatment” or innovation introduced by performance pay is so varied that it does not lead well to universal inferences about their properties. This paper uses several cases of performance pay policies in Latin America to shed light on the design of teacher pay component of the reforms, with the hope to contribute to understanding the different effects reported in the literature.

Author

• Paula Razquin, Universidad de San Andres