The Duty to Bargain: A Case Study on the Micropolitics of School District Collective Bargaining Negotiations in California

• In Event: Hilton Roundtable Session 17
  In Roundtable Session: The Effects of Teacher Policy Reforms on Collective Bargaining Agreements and Teacher Employment

Abstract

Long-standing state teacher policies advocated for by teachers’ unions are changing. State lawmakers have reformed teacher tenure rights, abolished experience-based step and column salary schedules in favor of pay-for-performance plans, and implemented new evaluations systems that require teachers to be evaluated based on their students’ performance. As with any top-down education policy reform, success or failure is dependent on the ways reforms alter the local practices of administrators, teachers, and students. In particular, these new policies intersect with the institutional structure of school districts (e.g. rules, established practices), which are often resistant to change.
One such important, although oft ignored, institutional structure is the collective bargaining negotiations between school district officials and local teachers’ associations. Required or permitted in 43 states, bargaining negotiations are responsible for determining a wide swath of district policies. Given their prominent role, these agreements present a potential challenge for reformers wishing to alter the practices of school districts. State policy changes are occasionally at odds with language in teacher contracts, and consequently, must be implemented through the negotiation process as required by “savings” clauses in the agreements. While extant literature provides some guidance on the impact of agreements on district and student outcomes, we know little about the process by which school districts and teachers’ unions arrive at final bargaining agreements, particularly in the face of new mandates.
The purpose of this study is to better understand the micropolitical processes of collective bargaining negotiations in California, where the threat of new policy changes related to teachers have occurred. I draw upon theoretical observations from vested interest theory, the ecology of games framework , and micropolitical theory. Briefly, I conceptualize bargaining negotiations as a complex political process influenced by a confluence of reform issues at the state and local levels, the interests, strategies, and actions of policy actors, and the local economic, social, historical, and political environment that condition these actions. I ask: 1) How are local-level actors responding to the threat of new state legislation as they bargain new CBAs? 2) What led to the adoption of recent changes to CBAs? To answer these questions, I utilize a case study approach built on 30 interviews from state, regional, and district union and education leaders. Interviews are supplemented with document analysis (e.g., CBAs and media reports).
I find that bargaining negotiations become more contentious in face of potential state-level reforms. Local union leaders responded to proposed state legislation by attempting to strengthen contractual protections for their teachers. Their approach to bargaining was influenced by their regional and state union leadership, creating a certain degree of isomorphism in how unions across the state approached the bargaining table. If the face of union pressure, district administrators often reported having to compromise in order to maintain labor peace. Overall, this study is the first to study the politics of collective bargaining negotiations, presenting as a political process of give-and-take that is influenced not only by local-level actors, but also by state and regional union and school leaders.

Author

• Bradley Marianno, University of Nevada - Las Vegas