Getting Over "Truth," or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Post-Truth World

• In Event: Educational Responses to a Post-Truth World: Diverse Theoretical Approaches to Improving Thinking About Scientific Issues

Abstract

Within science education, concern about “fake news” and the “post-truth” world is rampant. We are failing, a typical argument runs, because our students (and the adults they become) are unable to distinguish accurate, well-substantiated claims about the natural world from inaccurate, poorly substantiated claims. We are failing because students remain vulnerable to well-studied biases in human thinking and learning that distort their reasoning and prevent them from finding the truth. But what if truth—and individual reasoning about truth—are beside the point?

Two assumptions underlie the argument presented above. The first is that obtaining truth—or, more specifically, the ability to discern some kind of definitive correspondence with reality, is of primary concern. The second is that we can address flaws in judgment by improving individual reasoning. We propose alternatives to both of these assumptions that have practical implications for how science education addresses the challenge of “fake news” and the “post-truth” world. First, we argue that judging the absolute status of truth claims matters less than the intellectual and practical possibilities that particular claims opens up, and how people act on those possibilities. Second, we propose that reliable knowledge—and high-quality evidence-informed decisions—depend more on robust social processes than robust individual reasoning.

We proceed through a form of systematic analysis and critique that are adapted from the analytic philosophical tradition (Ruitenberg, 2010; Holma, 2010): having identified the assumptions underlying a claim, we examine those assumptions in the light of key philosophical ideas, which allows for illumination of both the assumptions and the original claim under scrutiny. Our argument draws on the venerable tradition of pragmatism and the more recent focus on knowledge-making communities. Pragmatism (Dewey, 1916, 1925; Hickman, 1990) argues that scientific truths are misconceived as ends in themselves and are seen more accurately as means to ends—provisional but useful set of tools for action. Philosophical research on knowledge-making communities (Longino, 1991; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) reveals the practical and epistemological value of robust social process—how good knowledge results from working together in particular ways.

In light of the emerging consensus on science literacy (National Academies, 2016), these ideas lead us to conclude that individual reasoning about truth is less educationally important than we typically assume. Instead of equipping individuals to distinguish truth from falsehood in an unbiased manner—a goal for which existing research gives us little hope—we should embrace the instrumental and social nature of public engagement with science. This would mean placing less educational emphasis on the truth value of science and on judging claims based solely on their truth value, and more emphasis on using imperfect bodies of evidence to make concrete choices, as well as more time fostering productive norms that enable heterogeneous groups to debate and act on evidence together. These changes will leave students better prepared to act in a world in which truth and expertise are contested, and evidence is inevitably incomplete.

Authors

• Noah Weeth Feinstein, University of Wisconsin - Madison

• David Isaac Waddington, Concordia University