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In competitive learning environments such as academic departments using final selective exams, individuals tend to exploit the knowledge of others while providing them with as little information as possible; this phenomenon is explained by an increase in performance-approach goals (the aim to outperform others; hereafter referred to as “performance goals”; see Toma & Butera, 2015). In this research, we argue that highly selective exams not only predict the strength of performance goals, but also the reasons to which they are linked (for the distinction between goals and reasons, see Deci & Ryan, 2000; Elliot & Thrash, 2001). We posit that highly selective exams create an external incentive to outperform others, thereby promoting the endorsement of performance goals for controlled (out of an institutional pressure) rather than autonomous (out of a personal interest) reasons. Yet, controlled (vs. autonomous) reasons for goal endorsement predict threat appraisals (Ntoumanis et al., 2014), leading performance goal-oriented individuals to be more morally disengaged and to display antisocial behaviors (Senko & Tropiano, 2016; Vansteenkiste, Mouratidis, & Lens, 2010). Thus, we hypothesized that in highly (vs. weakly) selective departments, performance goals should be a stronger predictor of exploitation orientation toward information exchange, and that this interactive effect should be explained by the fact that these goals are endorsed for controlled reasons.
In Study 1, we tested the full hypothesis in a “real world” environment. Students (N = 166) from two preparatory programs sharing a majority of common courses completed a questionnaire. The first program used self-assessment methods (i.e., no selection) and the second program highly selective final exams (at the end of each semester). Performance goals were found to predict a higher exploitation orientation in the selective program, and this interaction was explained by an increase in the controlled reasons associated with these goals.
In Study 2, we experimentally tested the causal effect of the selective nature of the exam (the independent variable). Students (N = 187) were presented with an intelligence test that was either presented as a self-evaluative tool (no external evaluation and no selection), an evaluative tool (external evaluation, but no selection), or a selective tool (i.e., external evaluation and selection). Performance goals were found to be associated with more controlled reasons in the highly selective condition.
In Study 3, we experimentally tested the causal effect of the controlled reasons behind performance goals (mediator variable). MTurkers (N = 192) participated in a collaborative task with a bogus partner. They were either given performance goal instructions using an autonomy-supportive language (the choice to compete was theirs) or using a controlling language (they had no choice but to compete). Controlled reasons for performance goal endorsement was a positive predictor of self-reported exploitation orientation as well as an indirect predictor of information sharing behaviors.
These results extend our knowledge on the structural antecedents of achievement motivation (e.g., classroom goal structure) and enable motivation scientists to more accurately predict interpersonal behaviors in information exchange contexts.