Poster #83 - Teacher Incentives and Sorting: Performance Pay in Secondary Education

• In Event: 21.063 - MTCC Poster Session Three
  In Poster Session: 21.063-7 - Contemporary Issues in Educational Evaluation 1

Abstract

This paper evaluates the effect of a group pay-for-performance program by using a sharp regression discontinuity design. This is the first study that can disentangle the underlying mechanisms of a pay-for-performance program by separating the effect of the program operating through the incumbent and newly hired teachers. I evaluate the two potential mechanisms that generate the impact, teachers’ incentives and teachers’ sorting, and their relative importance. I find strong effects on the composition of the teaching staff: The winning schools attract more qualified teachers and aim for higher. I show that the effect of the program on school performance operates through both mechanisms, but it is stronger through teachers' sorting. This is an unintended outcome with important policy implications.

Author

• Joniada Milla, Saint Mary's University