Legally Navigating the New Digital Landscape: Precedent for Searching 1:1 Devices in Schools

• In Event: 66.068 - Policy and Precedent: An Examination of Legal Implications in Education for Policy Scholars

Abstract

Purpose
With broad application and deep storage capacity, 1:1 digital devices create a complex legal landscape for schools to navigate as they develop appropriate digital use policies. Diverging legal precedent means acceptable use policies allowing for unlimited search of digital devices may violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure. This paper investigates this quandary, exploring the possible legal standards applied to school search of digital devices.

Methods and Framework
I built my case using foundational educational Fourth Amendment cases, cases involving modern digital tools in schools, and scholarly interpretations of these cases. I used LexisNexis as a search tool to find relevant case law and legal literature.
The Supreme Court set the precedent for searching students in schools in New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), explaining that students have a limited expectation of privacy, as schools have a responsibility to maintain safety and discipline. Later, lower courts applied this standard to locker searches in Commonwealth v. Snyder (1992) and In re Patrick Y. (2000), setting conflicting and restricting standards for student privacy.
More recently, G.C. v. Owensboro Public Schools (2013), Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch Dist. (2006), and J.W. v. DeSoto County School District (2010), all argued under the Fourth Amendment, examined student privacy in the context of cell phone searches in schools, setting differing precedents and demonstrating the legal challenge of modern technology in schools in the context of T.L.O. Outside of the educational context, Riley v. California (2014) found the search of cell phones during an arrest to be unconstitutional because the devices may hold an unparalleled amount of personal information. Hoogstraten (2016) points out that Riley may indicate a need to reassess other warrantless searches in light of the new ruling on cell phones.

Findings
This paper discusses two ways for schools to understand the legal precedent for searching 1:1 digital devices. 1:1 devices may be understood akin to lockers with a lower standard for privacy because they are owned by the school but contain the personal property of students. This standard would allow schools to set policy allowing broad search of digital devices. 1:1 devices may also be understood as similar to cell phones with a higher standard of privacy in light of Riley v California (2014) because they are digital devices that may hold vast amounts of personal information. This legal precedent prevents school policy from allowing unlimited access to a student’s device, even if it is provided by the school. Devices may only be searched with a reasonable and specific scope and purpose. Searching digital devices in schools has a complex and conflicting legal precedent, and thus is deserving of further exploration.

Conclusion
This paper examines the complexity of understanding school-owned devices as analogous to either lockers or cell phones. Devices given to students in the context of 1:1 programs do not easily fit into either category, making them potentially legally ambiguous and thus deserving of further examination by legal scholars, courts, and school districts.

Author

• Alexandra J. Lamb, University of Connecticut - Storrs