Stakes in Test-Based Accountability Systems: An Analysis of Side Effects in Brazil

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Abstract

In Test-Based Accountability systems, illicit actions to raise student performance may be adopted. In this paper we focus on the interaction between teacher cheating and financial incentives attached to test results. Using data from the Brazilian evaluation system (SAEB), which reaches 73 thousand schools and 5.4 million students, we run probit models with fixed effects and interaction terms to explore to what extent financial incentives for schools and/or teachers make the likelihood of cheating increase or decrease. Our results point out a North-South gradient in cheating, which shows a clear socioeconomic divide across the Federal States. We also find a significant association between high-stakes and teacher cheating and discuss the key role of moderating variables (e.g. school segregation, schools' SES).

Authors

• Gerard Ferrer-Esteban, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya

• Andreu Termes, Autonomous University of Barcelona