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Objectives
This paper discusses the effects of standards-based accountability systems on students' educational outcomes, with particular attention to the social distribution of these outcomes.
Perspectives
I rely on economic and sociological perspectives on principal-agent theory in accountability systems, and Robert Merton's strain theory as an explanation of how agents respond to mandates and incentives when they cannot achieve the desired outcomes via legitimate means.
Methods
I use a narrative literature review, summarizing extant research on the effects of accountability systems on academic outcomes, and the difficulties in drawing conclusions about their effects.
Data sources
The evidence is drawn primarily from research on U.S. standards-based accountability systems published in books and refereed journals between 2000 and 2020.
Findings
I begin by discussing test-based school and teacher accountability systems in the U.S., with particular attention to No Child Left Behind. I then discuss the potential implications of test-based accountability systems for outcomes, including both the level of outcomes (e.g., excellence) and their social distribution (e.g., equity). I note that the recent shift from status- or proficiency-based measures of school and teacher performance to growth measures represents a fundamental shift in accountability system design, with implications not yet clear. There is more evidence on the effects of accountability systems on the level of student outcomes than on their distribution, and the effects described in the literature are heterogeneous, reflecting variations in policy design and implementation. I conclude with some potential lines of research for understanding the conditions under which standards-based accountability systems might matter, and these systems' indirect or unanticipated effects.
Significance
The study questions whether extant research on school accountability systems can serve as a faithful guide to education policy. I conclude that researchers must interrogate the mechanisms by which accountability systems, and the mandates, incentives, and other policy instruments embedded within them, are intended to influence students' academic performance. Some mechanisms may be intended, whereas others may be unintended or serendipitous. I also argue that researchers will benefit from review of the features of standards-based accountability systems, including the criteria that trigger rewards or punishments and the challenge level associated with those criteria. As much as policymakers might crave summary claims that standards-based accountability "works," the heterogeneity of system design makes such claims contingent.