Absence: Electoral Cycles and Teacher Absenteeism in India

• In Event: International Considerations of Education Policy and Politics

Abstract

Front-line service worker absence has commonly been cited as a reason for the poor performance of developing country public services. Teachers are often absent and, when present, not working. This absenteeism is expensive: a nationally representative sample of villages across India finds that teacher absence costs $$1.5 billion a year. This paper argues that one explanation for variation in absenteeism is the inter-temporal bargain between politicians and teachers over a politician's tenure. Using a panel of all government schools across India between 2006 and 2018, I find that teacher absenteeism decreases substantially in election years. Placebo tests on private school absenteeism finds smaller and inconsistent effects of election years on absenteeism in the private sector.

Author

• Emmerich Davies, Harvard University