Unions, Monitoring, and Deferred Compensation: Evidence From California School Districts

• In Event: Sheraton Roundtable Session Six
  In Roundtable Session: The Relationship Between School and District/State-Level Leaders: Understanding the Impacts of State- or District-Level Leadership on School-Level Practices (Table 4)

Abstract

Like many public agencies, school districts often heavily defer teacher compensation even when frontloaded compensation would plausibly be more efficient. I use two-way fixed effects models and detailed longitudinal data on collective bargaining agreements in California districts to test two common theories about the prevalence of deferred teacher compensation. I find suggestive evidence that unions prefer to bargain for more deferred compensation only when their members are more veteran. I find no support for the theory that administrators prefer to defer compensation when employee performance is difficult to monitor. These results suggest that other administrative explanations for deferred compensation may hold more promise and cast some doubt on the logic of recent efforts to restrict public sector collective bargaining rights.

Author

• Paul Bruno, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
  Presenting Author