American Pragmatism, Democratic Ethics, and Education

• In Event: Philosophical Inquiry as Consequential Research: Interrogating the Means and Ends of Ethics and Education

Abstract

This paper explores American pragmatism as an ethical tradition with educational ramifications by profiling the ethical views and educational implications of William James and John Dewey, and Richard Rorty. American pragmatism approaches education as integral to the ethical and political cultivation of a vibrant, pluralistic, democratic culture. Its philosophical orientation—away from the fixed and timeless and toward the contingent and contextualized—conceives of humans as active but fallible agents pursuing knowledge to address the concrete problems that their communities face. James, Dewey, and Rorty share a common recognition of the need to foster individual habits and collective sensibilities that center our moral imaginations, sympathetic attachments to others, and situatedness in social and natural environments. By highlighting our capacity for self-criticism and growth, the pragmatists outline a melioristic program of ethical collective and individual self-reform which they saw as essential to the realization of democratic communities attuned and responsive to the suffering of its members.
To begin, we locate the “spirit of pragmatism” in Peirce’s attack on the Cartesian method. Recognizing that individuals are surrounded by unfounded socio-cultural beliefs, Descartes argued that philosophers must clear the ground and prepare a strong foundation for the knowledge edifice. This split between subjective thought and an external world to be known persisted after Descartes. Peirce offered two anti-Cartesian arguments: first that Cartesian doubt is impossible – we cannot genuinely doubt our beliefs unless experience calls them into question; second, that Cartesian doubt is unnecessary – we can modify our beliefs by subjecting them to inquiry. What follows is a discussion of the major works offered by James, Dewey, and Rorty to interrogate the ethical and educational implications of the pragmatic tradition. First, knowledge development does not need foundations. Second, inquiry requires a community of inquirers. Third, factual and moral/value beliefs are on equal footing. Fourth, the pluralistic community of inquirers could be taken as an ideal model of democratic society and cooperative living. Finally, fifth, that a democratic society conceived in this way needs to initiate its members, with all of their differences, into practices of cooperative inquiry – that is, it needs the widest extension of democratic education.

Author

• Leonard J. Waks, Temple University
  Presenting Author