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The Sabbath as an Anti-Ritual: Hermann Cohen’s “DER SABBAT IN SEINER KULTURGESCHICHTLICHEN BEDEUTUNG”

Mon, December 17, 3:00 to 4:30pm, Seaport Hotel & World Trade Center, Beacon Hill 1 Complex

Abstract

Catherine Bell develops her thinking on ritual as a response to “symbolic” theories. A symbol is something that points beyond itself to some other meaning. Bell points out that the symbolic interpretation fails to account for the significance of the ritual act QUA act. A ritual act like kneeling does not simply POINT TO a meaning, but INSTANTIATES A RELATION. It operates on the logic of synecdoche: “The molding of the body within a highly structured environment . . . primarily acts to restructure bodies in the very doing of the acts themselves. Hence, required kneeling does not merely COMMUNICATE subordination to the kneeler. For all intents and purposes, kneeling PRODUCES a subordinated kneeler in and through the act itself.” Bell’s emphasis is on ritual as a form of social power. Her framing of this power in any given ritual as “the deployment of a particular construction of power relationships, a particular relationship of [interpersonal] domination, consent, and resistance.”
Cohen’s untranslated work “The Sabbath in its Cultural Historical Significance,” has often been read within the context of egalitarian politics, but it also interfaces with Bell’s understanding of ritual: On Cohen’s account, the Sabbath differs from its closest cultural counterparts precisely in that it 1) deploys a DECONSTRUCTION of power relationships rather than a CONSTRUCTION (contra Bell) and 2) operates on the logic of synecdoche rather than symbol (SECUNDUM Bell).
In this paper, I will lay out this account and how greater availability of this text (through English translation) would be valuable for contributing to an understanding of Jewish ritual. Continental philosophy (with all its theoretical influence on Religious and Jewish Studies) has long provided focus on the hierarchical context and implications of religious practice; Cohen’s work here provides a counterweight.
Attempts at deriving “the reasons for the commandments” have found criticism in the accusation that one is merely speculating about possible historical reasons and attributing essentially arbitrary symbolic meaning to the precepts. Cohen’s account, by focusing on what is inherent in the practice itself rather than anything external, constitutes an account that can bear itself more strongly against such criticisms.

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