Representative Bureaucracy through Hometown Identity: Evidence from Tax Burden

• In Event: Insights on Street-Level Bureaucracy

Abstract

In the context of representative bureaucracy, can hometown identity shape how bureaucrats interact with the clients they serve? Using data from tax administrations in China between 2002 and 2017, we tackle this question by examining how tax commissioners, when sharing hometown identity with firms, affect both the tax burden and compliance of those firms. Our findings reveal strong evidence of active and symbolic representation: hometown tax commissioners significantly reduce the tax burdens of local firms, and those firms, in turn, demonstrate greater compliance with tax laws. In addition to expanding the theory of representative bureaucracy by introducing hometown identity as a key factor in shaping citizen-government interaction, this research broadens its application to fiscal policy, illustrating how representation influences tax administration. These insights provide fresh perspectives on how geographic ties foster trust and influence governance (Meier & Capers, 2012), while highlighting the potential of representative bureaucracy in shaping public policy outcomes beyond traditional domains (Bishu & Kennedy, 2020).

References
Bishu, S. G., & Kennedy, A. R. (2020). Trends and gaps: A meta-review of representative bureaucracy. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 40(4), 559–588. https://doi.org/10.1177/0734371X19830154
Meier, K. J., & Capers, K. J. (2012). Representative bureaucracy: Four questions. In B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Public Administration (Second edition, Vol. 27, pp. 420–430). SAGE.

Author

• Dongfang Gaozhao, University of Dayton
  Presenting Author