“Politics, Federalism, and Administrative Inequality: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance Programs in the American States.”

• In Event: Designing Inequality Through Federalism? The Role of Policy Framing & Design for Inequalities in Access and Participation

Abstract

Are all citizens treated fairly in the administration of government programs? Many U.S. federal government programs are administered under the presumption of uniform legal restrictions and guidelines. In reality, how programs are implemented in practice systematically varies across national, state, and local political control of electoral institutions. In this study, we seek to disentangle how politics at the federal, state, and local levels generates differential administrative outcomes that reflect administrative inequalities. In this study, we examine systematic variation in the conferral (and withholding) of program benefits from U.S. federal unemployment insurance programs separately administered by state unemployment insurance agencies within a decentralized manner in the form of regional field offices within each state. The empirical data and design consist of utilizing large-scale administrative data on unemployment insurance claims and decisions made publicly available upon request by the U.S. Department of Labor, coupled with a novel database containing validated geocodes of state unemployment insurance agency field offices within 41 American states. This data is employed to evaluate how politics within the American federal system shapes administrative decisions on unemployment insurance program claims in a manner that reflects inequalities and biases depending upon the political geography of where unemployed residents happen to reside.     

FYI: We can analye all of the data (and present all of our results) since it covers pre-2025 and been in our possession prior to 2025. 

Author

• George A Krause, University of Georgia
  Presenting Author