Does discretion in defense attorney assignment by elected judges benefit defendants or judges?

• In Event: Courts, Crime, and Consequences: Using Administrative Data to Estimate Causal Effects of Court Interactions

Abstract

There is significant concern regarding whether publicly funded defense attorneys provide adequate legal assistance. One potential solution is to allow judges to incentivize better legal assistance and improve attorney-defendant match quality through the discretionary (and nonrandom) assignment of cases to attorneys.  On the other hand, such assignments can raise concerns regarding quid pro quo, where attorneys make donations to judges to secure assignments. This paper examines this question using data from a large county that began prohibiting discretionary case assignments in 2015. Results indicate that restricting discretionary case assignments reduced donations to judges by defense attorneys by 19 percent and reduced conviction rates by 9 percent.

Author

• Suhyeon Oh, Texas A&M University
  Presenting Author