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Paid Sick Leave, Points, and Presenteeism: The Challenge of Punitive Workplace Policies for Public Health Goals

Thursday, November 13, 1:45 to 3:15pm, Property: Hyatt Regency Seattle, Floor: 6th Floor, Room: 601 - Hoh

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic raised awareness of the dangers of presenteeism, or working while sick, to population health. Paid sick leave (PSL) mandates have been found to be effective in 1) extending access to this important benefit to previously excluded workers and 2) reducing transmission of communicable disease. However, labor standards compliance is far from uniform in the United States and corporate practices may constrain the ability of workers to claim these rights. In the realm of PSL, scholars and policy advocates suggest that punitive time and attendance policies, frequently called point systems, may punish workers for using even legally protected time off, resulting in presenteeism. However, little is known about the impact of these corporate policies and how they may interact with state-level PSL policies. We examine the intersection of worker exposure to points systems and state-level PSL policies to examine both the direct effects of points systems on working while sick and to ask if these associations are moderated in the presence of PSL laws.   


The study draws on new survey data collected by the Shift Project from 4,209 workers employed in 132 large service sector firms. The data included novel measurement of points systems, presenteeism, and geographic identifiers that allow a link to state-level policy. We document the prevalence of workers’ exposure to punitive time and attendance systems and present regression models of the association between exposure to points systems and presenteeism. Stratified models test whether impacts vary in jurisdictions with PSL laws in place.


We find that exposure to a points system increases the probability of working while sick by 18 percentage points. Similarly, exposure to a points system was associated with a 15-percentage point increase in reports that workers who did come to work sick did so to avoid punishment. Strikingly, these results are not limited to those who have actually accrued points or penalties – simply working under such a regime increased presenteeism. The presence of a state policy did not change the frequency of reports of the presence of points systems in the workplace. Additionally, the association between exposure to a points system and working while sick was the same whether PSL mandates were in effect or not, suggesting that corporate policy significantly constrained the effectiveness of public policy.   


While PSL mandates have been found to reduce the transmission of communicable disease through reduced presenteeism, our findings suggest that points systems may promote presenteeism and limit the individual and public health benefits of PSL laws. Research and policymaking related to punitive time and attendance policies are in their infancy, but our results establish that these policies present challenges to public health goals. Policy makers and advocates should ensure that job protection guarantees are enforced and engage in educational efforts with service sector employers and workers to maximize the benefits of PSL mandates. 

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