Building Bridges or Building Castles? Politics, Bargaining, and Governance in China’s LSRIs Boom

• In Event: AI, Power, and Political Narratives

Abstract

Introduction / Background

Large-scale research infrastructures (LSRIs)—synchrotron light sources, spallation neutron sources, deep-sea drill ships—provide experimental capacities that no single laboratory can replicate, making them de facto global public goods. International coordination bodies such as Europe’s ESFRI roadmap and the U.S. National Science and Technology Council attempt to prevent wasteful duplication, yet parallel facilities persist. Since 2015 China has approved more than fifty LSRIs, matching U.S. and EU investments while creating an unusually dense and sometimes redundant domestic network. “Catch-up” narratives overlook the political economy behind this boom; theories of fragmented authoritarianism and localisation bargaining suggest that decentralised fiscal power, competitive provincial politics, and technocratic legitimation jointly shape big-science outcomes.

Purpose / Research Questions

This study asks three questions: (1) How do central ministries, provincial governments, and scientific communities interact to determine LSRI siting and design? (2) Which political-institutional configurations produce duplication, and which foster consolidation? (3) How do China’s dynamics compare with those of the United States and the European Union?

Methodology

A comparative case-study strategy is embedded in a crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of all Chinese LSRIs that reached at least the feasibility-study stage between 2008 and 2024 (n = 57). The census records scientific field, capital cost, bibliometric impact, financing mix, decision nodes, and location. Four contrasting cases—the China Spallation Neutron Source, the Shanghai Synchrotron Radiation Facility, the steady-state Tokamak in Hefei, and the deep-sea drilling vessel Shiyan-1—are examined through policy archives and forty-two elite interviews to trace bargaining processes and informal side-payments. Insights from these cases guide the QCA, which tests whether configurations of provincial fiscal strength, scientist prestige, and inter-ministerial coordination are necessary or sufficient for duplication. OECD and ESFRI datasets provide an international benchmark.

Results / Findings

QCA identifies one dominant pathway to duplication: strong provincial finances, high-prestige scientists, and the absence of a cross-ministerial steering committee. Consolidation occurs only when an empowered inter-ministerial body is paired with cross-provincial cost-sharing—a combination present in fewer than one-third of projects. Process tracing shows scientists acting as brokers, converting epistemic authority into regional-growth narratives that persuade local leaders to fund LSRI bids. Fragmented veto points among central agencies enable provinces to bundle proposals with urban-development incentives, accelerating approval but diluting national portfolio coherence. Comparative evidence indicates that scientists play similar roles in the United States and Europe, yet tighter national road-mapping there disciplines sub-national competition more effectively.

Conclusion / Implications

This research speaks directly to key questions in collaborative policymaking. China’s LSRIs boom demonstrates that coordination failures stem less from technical planning gaps than from multi-level bargaining under fragmented authority. The complex interplay of government tiers, scientific communities, and local interests collectively producing a “castle-building” dynamic despite official rhetoric of collaboration. This contributes to broader debates on how to design, implement, and assess public policy that is resilient, inclusive, and informed by diverse voices.

Authors

• Baosi Bonnie Meng, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)
  Presenting Author

• Xun Wu
  Non-Presenting Co-Author

• JINXIN YAO
  Non-Presenting Co-Author