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Poster #117 - Underestimating the ideological complexity of outgroup members’ opinions drives partisan animosity

Friday, November 14, 5:00 to 6:30pm, Property: Hyatt Regency Seattle, Floor: 7th Floor, Room: 710 - Regency Ballroom

Abstract

Partisan animosity is on the rise in the US (e.g. Finkel et al., 2020; Iyengar et al., 2019) iand worrying researchers and policymakers alike. However, it is also increasingly affecting organizations in the private and public sector by threatening trust and cooperation (e.g. Dimant, 2024; Marks et al., 2019) and fuelling discrimination and incivility in the workplace (e.g. van den Bosch & Taris, 2014). A growing literature on interventions to reduce partisan animosity (e.g. Voelkel et al., 2024) has highlighted misperceptions of opponents’ ideological extremity – a phenomenon known as “false polarization” (Robinson, et al., 1995) – as a key driver of partisan animosity.


Here, we test whether partisans also underestimate the variability of opponents’ views - their “ideological complexity.” We hypothesize that whereas people recognize nuance in their own political views, they expect outgroup members’ views across issues to be one-dimensional, leading to increased animosity. We test this theory in a series of nine pre-registered online experiments (N = 4,520) and present two core studies below.


In Study 1 we tested whether partisans underestimate out-group members’ ideological complexity. Participants were asked to state their opinions on eight policy issues as well as their best guesses of a typical out-partisan’s opinions. Participants reported their views on 1-100 scales with a typical conservative opinion on one end and a typical liberal opinion on the other. We calculated ideological complexity as the variance of responses across the eight items.


Partisans perceived themselves as more ideologically complex, reporting more varied views across the eight issues than the level of variance they expected from out-partisans (d = 0.36; p < 0.001). Importantly, this difference persisted after controlling for perceptions of extremity, underscoring the robustness of misperceptions of ideological complexity.


In Study 2 we tested whether perceptions of complexity causally affect out-partisan evaluations. Participants read a statement by a fictitious out-partisan describing their policy views and randomly assigned to either a more or a less complex statement. Participants then reported how trustworthy, objective, moral, likeable, and intelligent they imagined that target to be on 7-point scales ( = 0.93).


Partisans evaluated out-partisans who were described as more ideologically complex more favorably (d = 0.47; p < 0.001). A parallel mediation analysis suggests that more than 40% of the effect are mediated by perceptions of ideological complexity, suggesting a causal link to partisan animosity above and beyond the effects of extremity perceptions.


Our findings highlight a novel psychological driver of ideological conflict, offering promising avenues for interventions that correct misperceptions of ideological complexity for managers and policymakers.

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