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Public sector unions are generally regarded as disruptive to government functioning. But what happens in political settings where the union and the government are led by the same political party? The state of Kerala in India has a strongly unionized public sector workforce, and the two prominent unions are affiliated to the two major political parties in the state. As such, union leaders affiliated to the party in government are likely to have strong connections to state political leadership. These connections have the ability to provide union leaders with resources and benefits that regular bureaucrats do not receive. First, this paper seeks to explore the kinds of resources union leaders can access through their distinct structural position; and what this means for what they are able to accomplish in their bureaucratic jobs and careers. Further, due to the same union-party link, union leaders in municipal governments of Kerala atypically have a dual commitment to both their union members and to the municipal government. Studying how union leaders allot their time and resources will reflect the ways in which they navigate these competing commitments.
This paper explores the distinct role of union leaders in municipal governments of Kerala to understand the kinds of exchanges that occur in unionized bureaucracies and the implications of these exchanges for what bureaucrats are able to accomplish in their jobs. It does so by drawing on original qualitative evidence: in-depth interviews with union leaders and regular bureaucrats in the municipal governments of the state of Kerala, India. Early evidence drawing on preliminary fieldwork indicates that union leaders receive support from political leadership in the form of protection from arbitrary disciplinary action, opportunities for longer tenures with less frequent transfers, and the ability to extend some of these benefits to colleagues and team members. This appears to indicate that union leaders have a distinct career trajectory compared to regular bureaucrats. The aim of this study is to provide a rich descriptive account of these phenomena internal to public sector unions and local governments in developing countries that have been understudied.
The author has yet to complete the major portion of data collection for this project, and plans to complete interviews over June-July 2025. As a PhD student, the author can only schedule intensive fieldwork and data collection during breaks in the academic calendar. As such, a draft of findings and analysis is expected to be ready for presentation by early September. The author's previous experiences interviewing retired bureaucrats-union leaders are expected to ease the data collection process.