Missing the Mark(et)? Application Deadlines and Pre-K Choice

• In Event: Early Childhood Impacts

Abstract

Despite the extensive literature regarding school choice systems, little attention is paid to the timing of application and enrollment decisions. Understanding families’ decision-making in choice contexts is essential to ensure that the design of choice systems aligns with their needs. This is especially true in early childhood education (ECE) choice systems, designed to expand access to developmentally beneficial formal programs (e.g., Campbell et al., 2002) that families might not otherwise be able to secure. 

I conceptualize preschool selection as occurring in two phases: an initial “choice market,” in which parents submit ranked applications based on current constraints and preferences, and an “aftermarket,” in which enrollment decisions are made months later, potentially under changed circumstances (e.g., Carrillo et al., 2017; Fong & Faude, 2018; Kull et al., 2016). This framework is particularly relevant in ECE where structural instability – such as housing insecurity and inflexible work schedules (e.g., Ananat & Gassman-Pines, 2021; DeLuca & Rosen, 2022) – may render initial preferences obsolete. 

In this study, I investigate whether preschool choice application timing influences enrollment outcomes, with a particular focus on economically disadvantaged families. In doing so, I test the "true preference" assumption embedded in centralized choice assignment algorithms – namely, that all families are able to report their school preferences at the time of application (Abdulkadiroğlu & Andersson, 2022; Pathak, 2017). I leverage a natural experiment created by a policy change in 2018, when NYC Public Schools collapsed its two-round pre-K application process into a single round, delaying the deadline to submit applications by 1-2 months. I thus examine divergence in families’ pre-K revealed and actualized preferences as a function of time elapsed between application and enrollment.

Using administrative data from 2015–2019 (~60,000 applicants annually), linked with census tract-level income data, I test whether the policy change disproportionately impacted families in lower-income neighborhoods relative to those in higher-income neighborhoods (based on whether they live in the bottom or top income quartile of NYC census tracts). I assess three enrollment outcomes indicative of preference instability: acceptance of an assigned offer, enrollment in a less preferred center (per application rankings), and enrollment in an unlisted center. These measures allow me to operationalize whether families’ reported preferences remain consistent by the time of enrollment and whether that consistency varies by socioeconomic status after the shift in application timing.

To isolate the effect of application timing, I use three quasi-experimental strategies comparing the outcomes of both groups. First, I use an event study approach to estimate how the shift from two to one application round influenced enrollment behaviors across the groups of interest. Second, I use propensity score matching (PSM) and risk-set fixed effects approaches to assess whether families’ socioeconomic status moderates their enrollment outcomes after policy shift, aiming to balance observable characteristics and preschool preference for families pre- and post-round change, respectively. 

Findings will inform both theoretical and applied conversations on centralized school choice systems. Results will offer policy-relevant insights into how modifying application deadlines could help improve equitable access to ECE in centralized pre-K systems.

Author

• Berta Bartoli, New York University
  Presenting Author