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Pretrial detention accounts for a growing share of jail incarceration, yet the large
literature on bail reform focuses almost entirely on monetary bail and low-level
offenders, leaving reforms that target violent offenders largely unexamined. This
paper studies the repeal of the Presumptive Denial of Bail statute in Virginia,
which, prior to its repeal, made defendants charged with specified violent offenses
presumed ineligible for bail. Using administrative court records from the Virginia
Court System and a difference-in-differences design comparing defendants charged
with treated and control offenses, I estimate the effects of repeal on case outcomes,
pretrial misconduct, and recidivism. I find that the repeal increased pretrial release
among treated defendants by 6.4 percent, and lowered conviction and incarceration
rates by 11.4 percent and 11.7 percent, respectively. I argue this improvement in
case outcomes is driven by a reduction in the coercive pressure detention places
on defendants to accept unfavorable plea deals. Although bail laws are designed
to prevent pretrial misconduct and recidivism, I find that increasing access to bail
does not increase failure to appear for court hearings or recidivism. These findings
suggest that restoring judicial discretion over pretrial detention, even for violent
charges, improves case outcomes without compromising court appearance or public
safety.