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Licensing regulation restricts entry into key markets, like childcare, and ensures that entrants provide high quality service. More stringent licensing creates a tradeoff between quality and access, since enforcing higher requirements can decrease supply of services. Research has shown that the tradeoff has real consequences for families. Approximately half of the families with children live in a childcare desert in the U.S. and in the case of California, more than 65% of the children under 5 years old live in areas with inadequate or zero childcare coverage. Lack of childcare is associated with lower labor supply and emotional distress for parents. We study the equilibrium impacts of licensing enforcement in the context of early childhood education. Using the childcare licensing program analysts’ (LPAs) stringency as an instrument for violations, we study the causal impact of violations on facility closure. We use novel data on childcare facility inspections in California between 2020 and 2025, which includes detailed information on licensed facilities and inspections. We augment this data with Census variables and estimate demographics such as race, ethnicity, and gender of childcare providers. Our empirical strategy relies on the quasi-random assignment of LPAs to childcare facilities and uses the variation in their stringency as a shifter of the probability that a violation is detected. We measure LPA stringency using a leave-out, residualized measure based on all other inspections that the LPA handled in a given year. This stringency measure is predictive of violations, but uncorrelated with inspection and facility characteristics. We find that violations lead to an increase of 4 percentage points in the probability of facility closure. Closures are not driven by involuntary administrative penalties like license revocation but instead result from equilibrium shifts in both supply and demand. We find evidence that violations decrease enrollment, which we use as a proxy for demand, and their impact translates into roughly a 6% decrease in revenues for the average facility. Additionally, we find that more serious issues and specially issues that are more costly to fix have greater impact on closure without causing significantly different effects on enrollment, suggesting that violations also affect closure by imposing higher operational costs to childcare providers. Overall, closure is more likely to result from administrative violations and have greater impact on home daycares and underserved areas. Our results also suggest that low quality facilities are more likely to exit after a violation, but that facilities in low supply areas are more likely to exit due to regulatory stringency. This implies that licensing authorities facing a tradeoff between quality and adequacy of supply should increase stringency in detecting care-related, rather than administrative, violations.