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Follow the Baton? The Impact of Loyalty and Competence on Bureaucratic Perception of Performance and Promotion

Thursday, November 5, 8:30 to 10:00am, Property: Boston Marriott Copley Place, Floor: 4th Floor, Room: Salon K

Abstract

Balancing political loyalty and professional competence is crucial for the effective political control of bureaucracies worldwide. Governments employ performance management to enhance competence, while utilizing political campaigns or monitoring to emphasize the loyalty aspect. While existing research highlights a tradeoff between loyalty and competence in political control of bureaucracy, we know less about how bureaucrats themselves weigh these attributes when judging job performance and promotion potential. We bring an organizational socialization perspective to this question by examining how public officials internalize loyalty and competence as criteria for performance, collaboration, and promotion. The extent to which they internalize these two values can offer critical insights into the success of macro-level government reforms and initiatives, as well as the micro-level bureaucratic incentives and behaviors.  This study examines how Chinese public financial managers perceive the balance between political loyalty and professional competence in the context of performance evaluations and promotions. We conducted a preregistered survey experiment with a national sample of approximately 3,000 public financial managers in China, utilizing a 2×2 factorial vignette design that orthogonally varies a hypothetical colleague’s political loyalty and professional expertise. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four vignette conditions, varying in the level of loyalty and expertise of a hypothetical colleague. They then evaluate the job performance and promotion prospects of that colleague, as well as their willingness to collaborate with them. We find that both attributes are valued, but with distinct roles: political loyalty is perceived as more critical for promotion, whereas professional expertise is deemed more essential for effective on-the-job performance and willingness to collaborate. These patterns are especially pronounced among lower-ranking officials and those with shorter tenure, suggesting that early-career bureaucrats are particularly sensitive to the regime’s promotion criteria. The emphasis on loyalty in promotion assessments aligns with China’s political context, while the centrality of competence for performance and collaboration highlights how bureaucrats distinguish between regime-facing incentives and the skills they rely on in their daily work.

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