The Causal Effects of Court Appearance on Eviction Outcomes

• In Event: Housing Instability for Low-Income Renters: Evictions, Arrears, and Policy Solutions

Abstract

Despite the large share of US eviction cases that resolve without tenants appearing in court, the consequences of non-appearance are not well-understood: could tenants benefit from appearing? 
I first study this question using quasi-random variation in Philadelphia that pushes some late-arriving tenants into court. I find that appearing in court reduces the likelihood of formal eviction by 22 percentage points (SE: 2) and increases protected days in the unit by 26 days (SE: 4), with no effect on amount owed. The IV results suggest there are meaningful benefits to court appearance. However, we have little information on the costs. If behavioral biases, such as inattention or incorrect beliefs about the benefits of appearing in court, inhibit court appearances, then it is possible that low-cost interventions might yield sizable welfare gains. To test for these information frictions, I also run a randomized controlled trial targeting Philadelphia tenants who have been filed against for an eviction and are awaiting their court hearing. I find that reminders increase appearance rates by 24% and that tenants are limited mostly by awareness of their court date. Furthermore, tenants induced to appear in court by text reminders are 23 percentage points (SE: 10) less likely to be formally evicted, have 24 (SE: 16) more protected days in unit, and do not owe their landlords more. These estimates corroborate the quasi-experimental findings. 
Lastly, I explore how a text-reminder policy compares to other widely-adopted eviction diversion programs, like right-to-counsel (RTC). I find that compliers are significantly less likely than the rest of the experimental population to be represented, suggesting that texts could help tenants who are not served by RTC programs. I also find that while RTC can reduce formal evictions by 1 pp at a cost of $66 and increase protected days in unit by 1 day at a cost of $26, text-reminders can reduce formal evictions by 1 pp at a cost of $0.56 and increase protected days in unit by 1 day at a cost of $0.55. These findings suggest that reducing default judgments are, at the very least, a cost-effective policy complement to more resource-intensive, eviction prevention strategies.

Author

• Kathy Bi, Princeton University
  Presenting Author