Poster #145 - What Drives Government Cooperation Networks in Cross-Regional Water Governance?

• In Event: Friday Poster Reception

Abstract

Environmental pollution is inherently characterized by cross-regional externalities, making environmental governance increasingly global, complex, and spatially interconnected. Local environmental problems often evolve into transboundary governance challenges, requiring sustained cooperation among local governments. In this context, intergovernmental cooperation networks constitute a foundational mechanism for achieving effective cross-regional water environment governance.

This paper investigates the evolutionary process and driving mechanisms of cross-regional local government cooperation networks in water environment governance. Drawing on Institutional Collective Action (ICA) theory, it examines how local governments coordinate collective action under conditions of cooperation risks, transaction costs, and institutional constraints, and how these dynamics shape governance outcomes.

Existing literature on intergovernmental environmental cooperation has primarily relied on cross-sectional data and static analytical approaches. Empirical studies are largely concentrated in regions such as the Yangtze River Delta, Yellow River Basin, and Pan-Pearl River Delta. However, relatively few studies have systematically examined how key factors—such as trust, cooperation incentives, risk allocation, and transaction costs—evolve over time in shaping water governance cooperation, particularly in Guangdong Province. To address this gap, this study constructs four temporal water environment cooperation networks covering 21 cities in Guangdong Province from 2009 to 2024, based on intercity policy documents, agreements, memoranda, and collaborative projects.

Using the Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model (TERGM), this study analyzes the formation and evolution of the cooperation network from four dimensions: endogenous structural effects, temporal dependence, actor attributes, and exogenous contextual factors. The results show that the network evolves through three stages: from “core-city-led coordination,” to “multi-center collaboration,” and ultimately toward “regional integration.” Cooperation is highly concentrated within the Pearl River Delta, indicating persistent spatial clustering.

Empirical findings further reveal that cities with higher economic development levels and stronger environmental governance pressure are more likely to establish cooperative ties. Geographic proximity, watershed ecological compensation mechanisms, and higher-level government involvement significantly facilitate intercity cooperation. Endogenous network processes, particularly transitive closure, also play a crucial role in reinforcing stable cooperation structures.

Goodness-of-fit diagnostics, including degree distribution, shared partner statistics, geodesic distance, ROC curves, and precision-recall measures, indicate that the TERGM model adequately reproduces the observed network structure and effectively captures its dynamic evolution.

Overall, the Guangdong water governance cooperation network exhibits a “core-periphery with gradual integration” pattern. Cooperation formation is jointly driven by structural embeddedness, actor-level heterogeneity, and institutional coordination mechanisms. From the perspective of Institutional Collective Action, this study advances understanding of the dynamic evolution of intergovernmental cooperation networks and provides theoretical and empirical insights for optimizing cross-regional water governance mechanisms.

Authors

• Shiming Zheng, Jinan University
  Non-Presenting Co-Author

• Shiming Zheng, Jinan University
  Presenting Author