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Enrollment, Targeting, and Labor Market Effects of Work Requirements: Evidence from SNAP

Friday, November 6, 8:30 to 10:00am, Property: Boston Marriott Copley Place, Floor: 4th Floor, Room: Salon I

Abstract

Work requirements in U.S. safety net programs are often presented as a way to encourage work and screen less-needy participants off the program. This paper studies the participation, targeting, labor, and welfare effects of work requirements in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) for able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs). Using administrative data from Virginia and quasi-experimental variation in county-level waivers from SNAP work requirements, I show that waivers increase ABAWD SNAP participation by 21.1%. Work requirement waivers improve the targeting efficiency of SNAP by increasing enrollment for more disadvantaged ABAWDs and by increasing participation among older and disabled adults living with ABAWDs. Turning to labor market outcomes, I show that work requirement waivers have no impact on earnings or employment. Using these empirical results I discuss implied welfare effects of work requirements and show that requirements cause a welfare loss to those affected; any gain must come from government cost savings. This paper has implications for recent expansions of work requirements in SNAP and Medicaid from the 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act.

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