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Nearly one in three Americans receive benefits from at least one means-tested social safety net program. Federal rules set eligibility thresholds for these programs uniformly as fixed percentages of the federal poverty level (FPL), irrespective of local variation in the cost of living. This uniformity across benefit allocations, although administratively simple, implies that individuals and families with identical real purchasing power may face starkly different eligibility outcomes depending on where they live. The geographic disparities in cost of living raises a long standing central question in the design of these programs: Should eligibility thresholds be indexed to local living costs? and if so, by how much?
I examine this question in the context of adjacent health insurance programs, although the overarching question speaks to a broader setting. I focus on two insurance programs: Medicaid, which provides free or low-cost coverage to individuals who satisfy a means test, and the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) individual insurance market, henceforth the Marketplace, which offers subsidized coverage to individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid and do not have access to affordable employer-sponsored insurance. In most states, the eligibility for Medicaid among non-disabled, non-elderly, childless adults is set at 138 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) in most states. Above this threshold, individuals purchase insurance in the Affordable Care Act’s individual market, or Marketplace, at subsidized rates if eligible. This uniform income-based rule does not account for geographic variation in the cost of living, which can sort otherwise similar households into different insurance markets. In a stylized setup, I first demonstrate that adjusting eligibility to the local cost of living increases coverage but also reallocates enrollees across markets, changing plan premiums and quality.
I then develop and estimate a model of adjacent health insurance markets in which regulators set eligibility rules, insurers compete on price and quality, and consumers either actively choose a plan or are passively assigned to one using California data. I quantify the effects of alternative, tractable state- and region-level eligibility thresholds. I find that adjusting eligibility thresholds increases aggregate consumer surplus net of public spending across all designs considered, but the gains vary widely across regions. I propose two explanations for this heterogeneity. The first is selection: whether newly eligible individuals were previously uninsured or privately insured. The second is fiscal offset: the extent to which additional public spending is offset by savings from reductions in uninsurance. I highlight how the design of eligibility thresholds interact with market structure and insurer incentives in segmented health insurance markets.